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REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE:
CONFUCIUS AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
CHIENKUO MI
ABSTRACT: Most of scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker
broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This paper seeks to overturn that
view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian
thought of the Analects is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the
significance of the Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past
overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that the Confucian thought is not
only of epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing
contemporary epistemology.
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Apt belief, animal knowledge, is better than belief that succeeds in its aim, being true,
without being apt. Apt belief aptly noted, reflective knowledge, is better than mere apt
belief or animal knowledge, especially when the reflective knowledge helps to guide the
first order belief so that it is apt. In such a case the belief is fully apt, and the subject
knows full well. (Ernest Sosa 2011, 12-13)
The Master said, “When you know, to know (recognize) that you know; and when you do
not know, to know (recognize) that you do not know; that is knowledge.” (Analects 2.17)1

1. CONFUCIUS’ THOUGHT IS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE
While the Confucius of the Analects has been regarded as providing a virtue-based
approach in ethics, he is not commonly noted as providing anything of
epistemological significance. (Yao, 2000: 33). In this paper I will argue that the
Confucian thought of the Analects is of epistemological significance, in particular for
virtue epistemology. In this section, I am simply making the case that particular
epistemological stances are taken in the Analects that are not merely commonsensical
________________________
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See translation and discussion by Sosa (2015).
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or obvious. Yet, in the context of the vast literature on Confucius, my claim is a bold
one. I am making a claim that runs counter to much ancient and contemporary
treatment of Confucius. In this section I will defend this claim. I had better also
account for why Confucius has not been seen as making a contribution to
epistemology. My focus shifts to this task in the next section.
Confucius is undoubtedly concerned with moral issues. In fact, on some
interpretations of the Analects, morality is the main concern. Jeffrey Riegel (2013), in
the Stanford Encycloedia of Philosophy, suggests just such an interpretation. He
writes that the Confucius of the Analects appears most concerned with moral matters.
In fact, because of the central place of virtues in Confucian thought, virtues such as
ren (universal benevolence), and Confucius' discussion of such virtue in relation to
the junzi, an exemplar of the virtuous person, Confucius is naturally seen as doing
virtue ethics.2 To be clear, I am not saying that those who see Confucius as making a
contribution to moral thought are mistaken. However, it would obviously be a
mistake to see Confucius as only having such a concern. Just like Aristotle, Confucius
is clearly concerned with what it is to be an exemplary person or good agent in a
much broader sense than a solely moral sense. For example, the inherent partiality of
xiao, translated as 'filial piety', is not obviously a moral virtue, though it is a virtue
discussed by Confucius: depending on whether morality is best seen as necessarily
requiring impartiality, it may be best to see xiao as a filial virtue (or an ethical virtue)
but not a moral virtue per se. In other words, on this view, xiao is a non-moral virtue,
which nevertheless the exemplary person possesses. This provides one basis for
thinking that it is a mistake to see Confucius as only being concerned with morality.
This claim, however, does not rest on that.
Confucius also lists zhi, wisdom, as a virtue. In fact, it is listed in the Analects as
one of three virtues that lead the way to becoming a jun-zi: "The wise (zhi) are free
from perplexities; the virtuous [actually ren] from anxiety; and the bold from fear".
(Analects 9.29, discussed in Mi 2015, 365). Zhi is, therefore, a significant virtue in
Confucian thought and an intellectual virtue at that.
A concern for what it is to be a good agent in a sense that is not reducible to the
moral is still within the domain of ethics. This is surely right in that the notion of
good agent is used in ethics not necessarily just to refer to the moral agent but rather
to the agent who lives well. We can categorize discourse on how to live well or
theories of the good life as ethics without taking either to necessarily be reducible to
moral theory. Confucius is, in fact, concerned with how to live well.
As with Aristotle, part of this living well in Confucian thought is constituted by an
epistemic component, of which there is detailed discussion. Confucius, unlike
Aristotle however, did not leave us any writings through which we could discover his
ideas. Rather, like Socrates, we learn about Confucius' ideas through records kept by
2

Early translations of the Analects rendered jun-zi as ‘gentleman’, though a more recent and perhaps
more apt translation from Ames and Rosemont (1998) translates jun-zi as ‘exemplary person’. (Wong
2013).
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his students. The record kept of Confucius' ideas was a series of short descriptions of
situations and what Confucius said in those situations. The form in which we have
Confucius' ideas is not such as to lend itself to comprehensive unambiguous accounts
of theoretical positions; interpretations of Confucian thought are required.
For this reason, I am not making the case that Confucius is a virtue epistemologist,
though, given the sophistication of his thought as evidenced in the Analects, I am not
saying he is not either. This is why in this section I defend the more restricted claim
mentioned earlier—that some of what Confucius said, as recorded in the Analects,
was of epistemological significance, particularly of virtue epistemological
significance.
Let us now turn to Confucian thought that is of epistemological significance. The
view that there is nothing of epistemological significance in the Confucian thought of
the Analects overlooks the fact that Confucius in the Analects, does have things to say
about epistemological matters. It is true, however, that Confucius does not approach
epistemological matters the way epistemologists in the modern era have tended to do
so. Confucius shows his concern for epistemological matters within an agent-based
approach. This is just the same way that he shows concern for moral matters. This
agent-based approach in Confucian thought is in keeping with the agent-based
approach of virtue epistemology more generally.
For example, according to Confucius, the exemplary person, in order for that
person to be exemplary, must carefully scrutinize what we would today call firstorder beliefs. If we want to have the epistemic status characteristic of the superior
man, then those first-order beliefs must be subject to appropriate reflection. This idea
is developed by distinction between two sorts of knowledge, shi (識) and zhi (知) in
the Analects. I (2015) have discussed this distinction in more detail and highlighted
the parallel with Sosa's distinction between animal and reflective knowledge.3 Shi,
which usually stands for “recognizing” or “memorizing” in Chinese, can be
understood as first-order knowledge, or information acquired. Zhi, on the other hand,
is second-order and is ascended to when first-order knowledge has been subject to the
right sort of reflection and thereby undergoes development. It is in the following
passage knowledge (zhi) is characterized as reflective knowledge:
The Master said, “When you know, to know (recognize) that you know; and when you do
not know, to know (recognize) that you do not know; that is knowledge.” (Analects
2.17).4

In the passage quoted below, there is also a description that indicates the significance
of the zhi and shi distinction for the exemplary person and, from the second sentence,
a characterisation of shi:
The Master said, “There may be those who act without knowing why. I did not do
3

Mi (2015) highlights that sources of shi are the senses and memory. Such knowledge allows us to
recognize, identify, differentiate, and simply to know certain things. As Mi points out, however,
Confucius is not very much concerned with first-order knowledge.
4
For further discussion of the epistemological significance of this passage, see Sosa (2015).
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so. Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it; seeing much and
keeping it in memory—this is the second style of knowledge [or a lower level of
knowledge].” (Analects 7.28).
What is important to note here is that Confucius, an exemplar too, indicates that zhi is
required for action, not merely shi. He does so by saying that he does not act without
zhi. In fact, aside from getting a distinction between two different sorts of knowledge,
we also get an indication as to why epistemological matters are significant for moral
matters. The virtuous person should have the right sort of knowledge, reflective
knowledge, before acting. From these passages, fragmentary though they are, we can
see that Confucius’ thought is of epistemological significance. In what follows, I will
explore the significance of that thought in greater depth.
2. LOCATING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF CONFUCIAN THOUGHT5
Within traditional Chinese scholarship there was not an epistemology on the modern
Western model, or, to simplify, a science of knowledge. There was no isolated study
of knowledge abstracted from daily concerns. It is therefore unsurprising that Chinese
scholars did not categorize Confucian thought as making a contribution to
epistemology as well as ethics.
In Western scholarship, certainly since Western scholars first came into contact
with Confucian thought and up until very recently, a strongly contrasting practice
hold sway. Knowledge and related theoretical issues, such as skepticism and
justification, have been studied in isolation from what it is to be a good agent. In fact,
for this reason, it is understandable that the epistemological significance of Confucian
thought has been overlooked. Confucian thought could not be seen as being of
epistemological significance by Western scholars, when that thought looked so unlike
epistemology as practiced by Western scholars.
So what is changed? In recent years, epistemology in the West has undergone a
significant shift. There has been “a virtue turn”.6 (Mi, Slote, and Sosa 2015). This has
meant that in much epistemology there has been a move away from the examination
of epistemic issues in isolation from one another to a theoretically unified agent-based
examination of epistemological issues.
As mentioned, this agent-based approach in epistemology, marks a new trend in
the field. The virtue turn has been a welcome response to the blockages and sclerosis
5

To be sure, there is a long Confucian tradition from the classical Confucianism, Song-Ming NeoConfucianism, all the way up to the contemporary Neo-Confucianism. However, the Confucian
thought I am focusing on here is mainly the Confucian thought of the Analects in the first three
sections, and moves on to the Confucian thought of The Great Learning in Section 4. Instead of doing
the scholarly interpretation work on the Confucian thought, I opt for doing philosophical work and
setting up the philosophical problematics plus their solutions.
6
Actually, this can also be described as a virtue return, as it marks epistemology's return to the
approach of Aristotle and Plato. (Mi, Slote, and Sosa 2015).
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that epistemology faced. The lack of a plausible theoretically unifying approach in
epistemology, and the lack of such an approach that was agent-based in particular,
have meant that there was an apparent undue, to many outside of the fielding,
perplexing focus on one particular sort of cases—Gettier cases; an inability to provide
a convincing account of a core, perhaps the core, concept of epistemology—
justification; and a failure of the narrow, theoretically ununified approach to produce
theoretical consistency across areas of specialization—the value problem.
The virtue turn has led to dialectical progress across all of these areas, though,
unsurprisingly, in none of these areas has the matter become settled. Virtue theorists
such as Sosa (2007) and Greco (2010) have offered robust virtue epistemological
solutions to Gettier cases, while Pritichard (2010) has offered an anti-luck virtue
epistemological solution.7 It should be noted that other virtue epistemologists have
regarded the decades long concern with the problem as mistaken and have developed
new areas of epistemology which are unconcerned with the analysis of knowledge
and solving the Gettier problem. (Baehr 2008).
Arguably the virtue turn was initiated by Sosa’s (1980) paper in response to the
problem of epistemic justification mentioned above. It was his pioneering work, “The
Raft and the Pyramid”, which introduced a virtue epistemological approach as a
solution to a mainstream epistemological problem. In the paper Sosa argues that both
foundationalist and coherentist accounts of justification suffer from fatal flaws but
that a virtue theoretic account can take the best from each approach while avoiding
the fatal flaws of each.
Linda Zagzebski (2003), a pre-eminent virtue theorist makes the case that a
widely supported account of epistemic justification—reliabilism, an account of
justification claimed by its proponents as necessary for knowledge, creates difficulties
in accounting for the value of knowledge. Plausibly, a good theory of knowledge will
not only be informative with regard to the nature of knowledge, but a good theory of
knowledge will also allow us to account for the value of knowledge—in particular,
the superior value of knowledge vis-a-vis mere true belief. The swamping problem
that Zagzebski identifies for reliabilists is addressed by leading virtue theorists such
as Greco (2011, 2010, 2009). Greco’s agent reliabilist response is to defend the claim
that knowledge is a kind of achievement, an achievement being a success from ability,
and that achievements have value that mere true beliefs lack.
The virtue turn in epistemology with its agent-based approach enables Western
scholars who examine Confucian thought to see its epistemological significance. In
fact, engagement by Western scholars with Confucian thought as virtue
epistemological has been almost non-existent up until now. Nonetheless, Sosa (2015),
a leading virtue epistemologist, does engage with an epistemological aspect of
Confucian thought. I have also worked on this matter for years, and make a further
effort and development here in this paper.

7

Pritchard (2010, 24) defines robust virtue epistemology as theories of the nature of knowledge that
account for knowledge exclusively on the basis of virtue and don't retain a separate anti-luck condition.
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3. CONFUCIAN THOUGHT – PROGRESSING THE DEBATE
Having made the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance, in
particular of virtue epistemological significance, I now turn to making the case that
Confucian thought can contribute to progressing contemporary virtue epistemological
discourse.
The recordings of Confucius’ sayings are indicative of well-thought out positions,
which chime with positions in contemporary debates in a number of areas of
philosophy. In fact, in my own virtue epistemological work, I have drawn on some
Confucian thought. The distinction in the Analects between different types of
knowledge is just one example.
There are, however, areas in Confucian thought, even with regard to the good
intellectual agent, which are unique and are worthy of further examination. Confucius,
for example, gives special place to reflection in what he has to say about the good
epistemic agent. While several philosophers in the contemporary literature are
developing positions with regard to reflection (see Kornblith 2012; Kvanvig 2014),
Confucius offers innovations in this area. These ideas are not merely of
epistemological significance, but have the potential to progress virtue epistemological
discourse. To see where Confucian thought can help progressing the virtue
epistemological discourse, it's important to provide some background to that
discourse.
An interest in the epistemological significance of reflection has been growing in
contemporary epistemological discourse. On the one hand, we can find a challenge to
its epistemological significance posed by Hiliary Kornblith (2012) and, on the other
hand, Sosa (2014, 2011) has also been advocating its epistemological significance.8
As I have discussed, Kornblith (2012, 1) charges philosophers with having a
mistaken view of the nature of reflection and its potential as a capacity. For example,
philosophers’ views of reflection, according to Kornblith, conflict with an empirically
informed view according to which reflection is not capable of bringing about
philosophical progress. In fact, he claims that many of the processes involved in
reflection are “terribly unreliable”. (Kornblith 2012, 1). In supports of his position,
Kornblith (2012, 23) cites various studies purporting to show that belief formation is
unduly affected by colours, anchoring effects, and so on.9
Kornblith's charge poses a challenge to Sosa’s (2014) theory of knowledge, which
accords a special place for reflection. Sosa (2014, 13) conceives of reflection as being
“something directed or turned on itself” or “meditation, or careful thought”. As
discussed, Sosa distinguishes animal knowledge from reflective knowledge. The
former is a brute knowing, while the latter is a meta-competent knowing.
Sosa (2011, 1-13) articulates this through his AAA (Accuracy, Adroitness, and
Aptness) model, which treats belief as a kind of performance. According to the AAA
model performances have three aspects by which they can be assessed. These three
8
9

See Mi and Ryan (2015) for examination of these two positions.
For further discussion of Kornblith on reflection, see Mi and Ryan (2015).
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aspects of performance are accuracy, adroitness, and aptness. Knowledge is a case of
a well performing belief and, as such, each of the three aspects are present in cases of
knowledge. In cases of knowledge, belief is accurate and so true, belief is adroit and
manifests competence, and a belief is apt—it is true because competent. Sosa calls
such well performing belief animal knowledge. Simply speaking, knowledge for Sosa
is simply an apt belief.
Reflective knowledge is a meta-competent knowing. It is a type of knowledge that
goes beyond animal knowledge. Sosa defines meta-competent knowledge as apt
belief aptly noted. Such belief also follows the AAA model of performance, though
the well performing belief of meta-competent knowledge is an order higher than apt
belief, requiring as it does belief. Such meta-competent knowing is belief recognized
as apt because of competence. For Sosa, this meta-competence is a reflective
competence. If, however, Kornblith is right that the processes involved in reflection
are 'terribly unreliable', then it is hard to see how reflection could qualify as a
competence and, in turn, how we can say there is such thing as reflective knowledge,
at least the sort of reflective knowledge that Sosa has in mind. If Kornblith is right
that philosophers don't understand the nature of reflection, then the task facing the
defender of reflective knowledge looks daunting.
In my own work, I attempt to answer that challenge and a crucial part in doing so
is informed by Confucian thought. In Confucian thought, it is the jun-zi, the virtuous
or exemplary person, who is properly reflective. This inspires the move to
differentiate between skillful reflection or virtuous reflection from unskillful
reflection or unvirtuous reflection, which in any case is a plausible distinction that
bears on the empirical data that Kornblith offers in support of his position that
reflection is 'terribly unreliable'.
My next step is to elaborate on the nature of reflection. Again, Confucian thought
shapes the account I have been setting out. While part of what I say about the nature
of reflection, and skillful reflection, draws on dual-process theory in psychology and
cognitive science, another part draws on what is said about reflection in the Analects.
In the Analects there is a distinction between two sorts of reflection. The
exemplary person's has a reflective capacity with two key components. There is a
perspective component and a retrospective component in the exemplary person's
reflective capacity and dispositional responses. This perspective component involves
perception and reasoning, which are directed at a certain goal or good. 10 In other
words, reflection that takes place draws on these capacities and does so with a
particular goal or goals in mind. The perspective component of reflection disposes the
virtuous agent to carefully look ahead when appropriate.
The retrospective component, on the other hand, utilizes memories and trained
responses. In this case, these responses aren't directed at reaching certain goals but at
moving away from or avoiding their opposites. The retrospective component of
reflection disposes the exemplary agent to carefully draw on learning from past
mistakes when appropriate.
10

The exemplary agent will have goods or appropriate ends as their goals.
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The Chinese ‘省’ is used for the retrospective component, while ‘思’ is used for
the perspective component, as we can see from the Analects:
The philosopher Zeng said, “I daily reflect (省) on myself with regard to three points:
whether, in transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful; whether, in
intercourse with friends, I may have been not sincere; whether I may have not
mastered and practiced the instructions of my teacher.” (Analects 1.4).
The Master said, “When we see men of worth, we should think (思) of equaling them;
when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and reflect (省) on
ourselves.” (Analects 4.17).
Ji Wen thought (思) thrice, and then acted. When the Master was informed of it, he
said, “Twice may do.” (Analects 5.20).11

So, skillful reflection has the model like a dual-sided mirror: On the one hand,
perspective reflection as thinking forward (or “思”), let us call it forward-looking
reflection, plays a role like a guiding light which lays out and shines through
objective evidence, information, and models in the conscious and conscientious mind
of the agent (who is thinking and making a choice of the right way to perform and
endeavor to attain his aim, whatever the aim may be). On the other hand,
retrospective reflection as thinking backward (or “省”), call it backward-looking
reflection, plays a role like a searching alarm which retrieves and inspects beliefs,
thoughts, and representations in the short term or long term memory of the agent
(who is examining any wrongdoing of his or hers in the past and is seeking his or her
best way to avoid or improve them in the future).
Reflection in both directions, has a great deal to do with Confucius's conception
of knowledge. As I have shown in my work 12 , perspective (forward-looking)
reflection and retrospective (backward-looking) reflection can square very nicely with
the ideas of “to know that you know” and “to know that you don't know”, both of
which can go hand in hand and make a joint contribution to our acquisition of
knowledge and the pursuit of the ultimate epistemic goal.
To understand what knowledge is and why we should want to acquire the kind of
knowledge Confucius proposes pursuing (to his students and to human beings in
general), the best way to proceed is to focus on the important concept of “learning”
(“學”) and the relationship between learning and reflection. A key passage from the
Analects of Confucius may help clarify matters here:
11

In these translations of the Analects ‘thinking’ is used for ‘思’. Elsewhere I make the case, following
John Dewey (1933, 9) that reflection is characterised by 'active, persistent, and careful consideration'.
It's clear that where ‘思’ is being used in the passages, it is described as an action with the above
characterization, hence I think reflection is the appropriate translation.
12
Mi (2015) emphasizes that for Confucius “to know that you know” together with “to know that you
don’t know” will constitute what he redeems to be the best kind of knowledge (or wisdom).
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The Master said, “Learning without thought is labor lost; thought without learning is
perilous.” (Analects 2.15)

We cannot emphasize enough the importance of learning in Confucius's teachings and
in his own career. He teaches his students (at the very beginning of the list of his
teachings in Analects) through rhetorical question that it is “pleasant (enjoyable) to
learn with a constant perseverance and application” (Analects 1.1).13 He also vividly
describes his own autobiographic career as follows:
At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no
doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven14. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ
for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without
transgressing what was right. (Analects 2.4)

Without learning, many desirable qualities of character or performance (moral as well
as intellectual) will become defective. Confucius gives six examples of the flaws that
result from supposedly good qualities when combined with a lack of effort at learning.
Let me just mention the one which is related to our topic here: “There is the love of
knowing without the love of learning - the beclouding here leads to dissipation of
mind.” (Analects 17.8) The love of knowing counts as a very good virtue and one of
the epistemic goals Confucius has set up for pursuing knowledge, but it will lead to
an empty mind and become fruitless if one has no desire to learn.
When we learn, we learn to acquire knowledge, to possess knowledge, and to
enjoy knowledge, be it common knowledge, practical knowledge, craft knowledge,
moral knowledge, or theoretical knowledge. That is why Confucius also compares
different degrees of dealing with the acquisition of knowledge, which we will see
reflected in three different grades of knowledge. He says: “They who know the truth
are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who
delight in it.”15 (Analects 6.20) Those who simply know the truth are people who can
acquire knowledge through their basic (cognitive) functions. Those who love (not
emotionally but intellectually) knowledge show their willingness and consciousness
13

Some may object that the point of Analects 1.1 here is to emphasize “practice”, but not “learning”.
However, it is quite obvious from what is being said here that Confucius emphasizes that it is pleasant
to “learn” and to “constantly practice what is learned”. Both “learning” and “practice” make a great
contribution to our reflective knowledge.
14
We also need to figure out what kind of knowledge Confucius has in mind in “knowing the decrees
of Heaven”.
15
Two points should be noted here. We should see each comparison as marking a step on one journey
to the highest standing. In other words, while loving the truth is superior to knowing the truth, loving
the truth also involves knowing the truth, and while enjoying the truth is superior to loving the truth,
enjoying the truth also involves loving the truth. The second point regards the object of each of the
stages (the object of knowing, loving, enjoying). I interpret “之” as “truth”, though my point would
also hold if “dao” was the interpretation. Furthermore, I am not taking truth here to refer only to
empirical propositions. I take it also to include such truths as moral truths. I reject therefore, a purely
intellectualist interpretation of this passage, just as I reject a purely moralist interpretation of this
passage.
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to employ a higher cognitive mechanism in order to grasp what they have learned and
secure the possession of knowledge. Finally those who delight (with no doubts and no
regrets) in knowledge possession can savor the love of knowledge and enjoy the
highest epistemic status, that is, they can achieve comprehensive understanding.
The following two questions bring into focus the relevance of what has been
discussed in the previous section. First, what role can reflection play in our overall
learning and acquisition of knowledge? Second, what are the proper epistemic goals
in our pursuit of knowledge? The two questions are closely related.
Let's first see how reflection and learning interact with each other, and further
contribute jointly to the acquisition of knowledge. Learning, according to Confucius,
requires the learner to frequently revisit what he has learned and to make good use of
it. Most translations emphasize the importance of putting what you have learned to
good use, repeated practice, and repeated application. However, if we take into
account and consider Confucius' observation that “learning without thought is labor
lost” (“學而不思則罔”) and his advice to “keep cherishing old knowledge, so as
continually to be acquiring new” (“溫故而知新”, Analects 2.11), then we will not
only see the equal importance of repeatedly revisiting and cherishing the old
knowledge we have learned, but also realize the real point of constantly practicing
and applying it.
The real point of Confucius' “learning and practice” (“學習” in Chinese) has to do
with reflection in both directions (forward-looking and backward-looking). Without
perspective reflection (careful and conscious deliberation) as guidance for learning,
our pursuit of knowledge will be puzzling and fragile. Without retrospective
reflection (cautious and conscientious examination) as an inspector of learning, our
acquisition of knowledge will be labor lost and go nowhere.
Learning without reflecting (with both directions), not only results in failure to
improve, but may also lead to us making easily avoidable mistakes as well. However,
Confucius also understands that we cannot simply reflect without new learning either.
Without having inputs from learning, our reflection will become empty and
eventually fade away. Without the kind of first-order knowledge in hand—what we
learn from seeing, hearing, touching, practicing, or even reasoning—we will have no
objects that we can reflect upon. While we learn, we learn our everyday knowledge,
be it practical knowledge, craft knowledge, or knowledge about the external world.
While we reflect upon what we have learned, we learn even more and know even
better. As such, reflection can help us reach the highest grade of knowledge.
4. CONFUCIAN CONTRIBUTION TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY
I have been concerned here to show that not only is the Confucian thought of the
Analects of epistemological significance, but that it can help us progress
contemporary virtue epistemology. By focusing on reflection as a virtue, we can
account for the possibility that reflection is ‘terribly unreliable’ in some cases, while
defending the claim that in some cases, for agents with the requisite virtue, it is not.
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In my discussion of Sosa's virtue epistemology, I have highlighted the central role that
reflection plays in one of the leading theories of knowledge. While the place of
reflection in Sosa's theory demonstrates the significance of reflection, the Confucian
understanding of reflection is of importance as it tells us about the nature of this
epistemologically significant element. This provides a basis for understanding an
aspect, plausibly a central aspect, of the epistemically virtuous agent that has been
under explored in the contemporary literature.16 Next I highlight a number of other
areas in which Confucian thought can progress virtue epistemology.
Aside from helping us understand the nature of reflection as a virtue, Confucian
thought on the reflection of the exemplary agent, together with the Confucian
distinction between two different sorts of knowledge, helps us diagnose what goes
wrong in the Fake Barn County case, and why, were there to be knowledge in such a
case, it would be of a superior sort of knowledge.17 (Mi 2015, 366). Let's consider the
Barney case, as described by Pritchard (2012, 251):18
Using his reliable perceptual faculties, Barney non-inferentially forms a true belief that
the object in front of him is a barn. Barney is indeed looking at a barn. Unbeknownst to
Barney, however, he is in an epistemically unfriendly environment when it comes to
making observations of this sort, since most objects that look like barns in these parts are
in fact barn façades.

For Sosa, Barney has animal knowledge and so is fully competent though he doesn't
have the complete second-order competence necessary for the apt belief to be aptly
grasped.19 By distinguishing animal knowledge (apt belief) from reflective knowledge
(apt belief aptly noted as such) and explaining the Barney case as a case of animal
knowledge, Sosa provides a position that goes some way to reconciling competing
intuitions with regard to the case.20
While concurring with much of Sosa's position in this matter, we can identify the
problem in the Barney case as a failure to manifest a competence of skillful reflection
(some kind of metacognition). Certainly Barney is unfortunate. How could he have
known that he was in such a situation? This, however, is beside the point – sometimes
knowledge, especially reflective knowledge, is hard. 21 That we deny that he has
16

While there is a contribution to contemporary virtue epistemology from the Analects, of course what
is said there requires careful interpretation and isn't elaborated upon the way positions in contemporary
epistemology tend to be. So while we might like to know more about reflection on Confucian thought,
what we have from the Analects on reflection is limited. Yet as evidenced from the quoted passages
and the discussions of those passages, what we do have is intricate, plausible, and interesting thoughts
on reflection that fit well with our pre-theoretical image of the epistemically virtuous agent.
17
The Fake Barn County case appears in a paper by Goldman (1976), though the author credits Carl
Ginet with the example.
18
The original barn façade case first appeared in a paper by Alvin Goldman (1976). Goldman credits
the example to Carl Ginet.
19
This is owing to his situation. (Sosa 2012, 12).
20
Greco (2010), by arguing that abilities are environment-relative, offers a different way for dealing
with Barney-type cases. For criticism of this response, see Author B (2014).
21
Exercising the relevant metacognition in a given situation does not imply engaging in a lengthy
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reflective knowledge on the basis of his failure to manifest metacognition does not
imply that we think that an agent has to exercise the same carefulness in every
situation. Of course, when a situation doesn't call for such carefulness, there is no
need to manifest such carefulness. 22 Recall, the reflection of the exemplary agent
aims both at goods and seeks to avoid bads. While Barney in Fake Barn County is,
let's assume, aiming at truth when he forms his belief, a plausible interpretation of the
case is that Barney does not exhibit the retrospective component of virtuous reflection,
though this is precisely the sort of case when such retrospective reflection is required
to avoid going wrong. If he were to engage his retrospective reflection, then we
would at least expect him to be more cautious and sensitive in his belief. It's also the
case, that were Barney or any agent to get something right because of competence in
the face of a hostile epistemic environment, then that competence would likely
involve a reflective capacity to overcome the misleading appearances that hostile
epistemic environments typically involve. This indicates an epistemic contribution of
virtuous reflection.
Confucian thought, this time in The Great Learning, has another contribution to
make to epistemology.23 In this case, it most obviously does so in the area of social
epistemology. While The Great Learning is concerned with reflection, it is also
concerned with 'extended knowledge'. At the very beginning of The Great Learning,
we learn what it is about: "The way of great learning consists in the manifestation of
manifesting virtue, in reaching out to others, in achieving ultimate goods".
According to the text, when reflection and extended knowledge are appropriately
developed, then final goods may be attained. More specifically, second-order virtue,
of which virtuous reflection is an example, puts us in a position to work towards
obtaining the best kind of epistemic goods. We should begin by trying to comprehend
the world around us. This means taking in information or a subject matter in a way
that is systematic. By doing so we are better positioned to weed out errors from our
own mind and eventually reach understanding and wisdom—the best kind of
epistemic goods. The other theme of The Great Learning regards 'extended
knowledge' which concerns epistemic cooperation with others, and requires reflection
and consensus. By establishing consensus a group has peace or harmony which
allows it to persist as a social unit and facilitates learning cooperation within the
group. This attention to the need for consensus within epistemic groups is an
alternative to the common knowledge requirement for group knowledge. While we're
not going to make the case for preferring consensus to common knowledge as such a
requirement here, our point is to draw the reader's attention to the alternative we get
process of reflection every time one forms a belief. As we have seen, reflection may lead to a
metacognition that is immediate.
22
We're not saying that Barney is blameworthy. The point is purely the epistemic point as to what
would need to happen in order for Barney to have knowledge. He is not in an environment in which
what look like barns are barns, rather he is in an environment in which lots of things that look like
barns are actually barn façades.
23
Aside from the Analects, The Great Learning, along with two other texts make up what are regarded
as the canonical Confucian texts. (Mi and Ryan forthcoming).
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from Confucian thought, which, even if ultimately rejected, can help develop the
discourse on this topic. Now let's consider Jenny the Chicago visitor’s case for a
further different, though related, point:
Our protagonist, whom we will call “Jenny”, arrives at the train station in Chicago and,
wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult passer-by that
she sees. Suppose further that the person that she asks has first-hand knowledge of the
area and gives her the directions that she requires. Intuitively, any true belief that Jenny
forms on this basis would ordinarily be counted as knowledge. (Pritchard 2010, 40).24

What is important about this case is that Jenny plausibly is required to exercise a
relevant counterfactual sensitivity (Pritchard 2010). For example, were the delivery of
the testimony to be relevantly strange, say it is delivered with suppressed sniggers, or
the content strange, suppose the testifier were to say to her to take the next train back
to New York, the agent would be appropriately responsive to such factors. Such a
responsiveness could involve not believing the testifier. Such a response to the Jenny
case is not unique but appears somewhat ad hoc in that we don't get such a diagnosis
from virtue epistemologists in other cases. Let me diagnose this case by bringing the
Confucian ideas:
(1) On Sosa’s account, an cognitive agent is in the running for knowledge if her belief
is formed competently, by some intellectual virtues, a particular sort of reliable
process. The cognitive achievement of attaining knowledge is creditable to the
agent because the achievement (arriving at the truth) manifests the agent’s
abilities.
(2) Our protagonist, whom we called “Jenny”, arrives at the train station in Chicago
and, wishing to obtain directions to the Sears Tower, approaches the first adult
passer-by that she sees. Suppose further that the person that she asks has firsthand knowledge of the area and gives her the directions that she requires.
(3) Intuitively, any true belief that Jenny forms on this basis would ordinarily be
counted as knowledge (testimonial knowledge). However, it is also intuitive that
we should give the credit to the testifier (the adult passer-by), since it is him that
has first-hand knowledge of the area.
(4) It seems to be right to think that Jenny’s true belief is of some credit to her as
well. After all, having arrived in the city and not knowing where one of the city’s
famous sights is, asking someone how to get to that sight is the right kind of thing
to do; and it’s not as if she would ask a young child, she asks adult, and she didn't
ask one who obviously looked like a tourist.
(5) Furthermore, Jenny wouldn’t have just believed the testifier she asked no matter
what that testifier said. Had the testifier given Jenny directions while say trying to
suppress sniggers, then Jenny wouldn’t have believed him. As well as how the
testimony is delivered, what testimony is delivered, or in other words the content
of the testimony, may also influence Jenny’s judgment. If Jenny were told, upon
24

This example is originally from Jennifer Lackey (2007, 352). She used the case to support her claim
that we don't deserve credit for everything we know and challenge Greco's virtue epistemology.
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(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

asking how to get to the Sears tower, to take the next train back to New York, then
she wouldn’t have believed the testifier. If all this is right then it seems correct to
say that Jenny’s true belief is of credit to her as well.
Defenders of an extended cognition thesis already employ a requirement very
much like the appropriate integration requirement. This requirement has
sometimes been expressed as a coupling relationship. (Clark and Chalmers,
1998). The requirement is that for extended cognition to take place, the
organismic agent must be properly integrated with an object (or subject) beyond
that organismic agent. Jenny in this case can be seen as exhibiting her extended
cognition.
Extended knowledge requires not only extended cognition, but also social
institution. Extended cognition in turn requires an appropriate coupling relation,
and extended knowledge involving social institution requires epistemic
consensus. One can't have an appropriate coupling relation and epistemic
consensus without reflective knowledge.
In the Jenny case, the agent's belief is guided by reflective knowledge. Her firstorder testimonial beliefs have been guided by her reflective knowledge. More
specifically, her belief about the location of the Sears Tower has been informed by
her reflective knowledge about the reliability of testimonial knowledge in the sort
of circumstances that she is in.
Jenny plausibly has an apt belief, her belief is accurate because it's adroit and so is
apt. Jenny, given the description of the case, plausibly also qualifies as enjoying
reflective knowledge (knowing full well). It's not as though she doesn't know why
she believes as she does, she would presumably say something along the lines of
she believes as she does because she knows testifiers are reliable about the
location of famous landmarks in their city.

This paper has made the case, contrary to traditional readings of Confucius, that
Confucian thought, Confucius in particular, is of epistemological significance. I
provided an explanation as to why it's unsurprising that the epistemological
significance of Confucian thought has previously been overlooked, while locating
that significance in the contemporary epistemological literature. Each of these tasks
were, in fact, complementary, with the epistemological significance of Confucian
thought best being located within virtue epistemology, and the only recent reemergence of virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology helping us understand the
overlooking of the epistemological significance of Confucian thought. Next I made
the case that Confucian thought is not just of epistemological significance, but that it
also can contribute to the development of the contemporary discourse. For this we
focused on reflection on the significance of reflection in the contemporary debate and
what we learn from Confucius about the nature of reflection in the Analects.
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